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Instrumental Variables Before and LATEr
Toru Kitagawa
Abstract. The modern formulation of the instrumental variable meth-
ods initiated the valuable interactions between economics and statistics
literatures of causal inference and fueled new innovations of the idea. It
helped resolving the long-standing confusion that the statisticians used
to have on the method, and encouraged the economists to rethink how
to make use of instrumental variables in policy analysis.
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It is an honor to comment on Professor Imbens’
paper on instrumental variables methods. The dis-
cussed paper reviews both the origin of the in-
strumental variables methods in econometrics and
their modern formulation and interpretation based
on the concept of potential outcomes originating in
statistics. A unique feature of this review article
is its comparative perspective. Imbens convinces us
that “choice versus chance in treatment assignment”
best summarizes the difference between economet-
rics and statistics in their traditions of identifying
causal effects.
The seminal papers by Angrist, Imbens and Rubin
(Imbens and Angrist (1994); Angrist, Imbens and
Rubin (1996)) on the potential outcome-based for-
mulation of the instrumental variables method are
some of the few rare works that generated equally
enormous influence on both econometrics and statis-
tics communities. In the economics side, the ma-
jor impacts appear in the following three aspects.
First, the modern way of viewing an instrumental
variable in relation to treatment noncompliance and
an encouragement design widened the scope of ap-
plications of the method. Traditionally, the uses of
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the instrumental variables method were restricted
to observational studies, and economic theories or
researcher’s background knowledge on the problem
were playing a unique role in validating the exo-
geneity and exclusion restrictions of the employed
instrument. Nowadays, this new encouragement de-
sign viewpoint offers another strategy for finding an
instrument in a given application, and with a ran-
domized initial treatment assignment, researchers
can validate easily and credibly the instrument ex-
ogeneity assumption without resorting to an eco-
nomic theory. Second, the concept of the local aver-
age treatment effect considerably changed the way
we interpret the estimation results. We are no longer
puzzled by obtaining contradicting estimation re-
sults across different instruments, and we treat them
as separate and valuable pieces of information about
heterogeneous causal effects. In addition, acknowl-
edging nonidentfiability of the population average
causal effect has promoted the discussion of whether
the instrumental variable method should be used for
the actual policy decision making and how. Third,
the discovery of the importance of instrument mono-
tonicity assumption led us to think more carefully
about the subjects’ causal/behavioral responses to
the assigned instrument.
In what follows, I first illustrate by an example the
link between the textbook linear instrumental vari-
able model and the potential outcome framework to
complement the discussion that Imbens gave in Sec-
tion 6. In the second part, I review the active but
unsettled discussions about usefulness of estimat-
ing the local average treatment effect, and provide
briefly my personal opinion on the issue.
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1. CAUSAL INTERPRETATION IN THE
TEXTBOOK MODEL
The standard econometrics education introduces
the instrumental variables methods in the form of,
what Imbens called, the standard textbook set up,
Y obsi = β0 + β1X
obs
i + β
′
2Vi + εi,(1.1)
where Y obsi is an outcome observation of unit i, X
obs
i
is a treatment variable of which the causal effect on
the outcome is of interest, Vi is a vector of observable
covariates (often called control covariates), and εi is
an unobservable term often called as an unobserved
heterogeneity of unit i. A common way to motivate
the use of instrumental variables is by invalidating
the least square method due to “the correlation be-
tween Xobsi and εi.” This quick but somewhat less
rigorous way of motivating the instrumental vari-
ables methods often creates confusions. If equation
(1.1) were specifying a regression equation or a lin-
ear projection, then the projection residual εi is by
construction uncorrelated with Xobsi , and, accord-
ingly, the concern about endogeneity E(Xobsi εi) 6= 0
would never arise. In other words, whenever instru-
mental variable methods are invoked, it is funda-
mental to understand what feature or interpretation
of (1.1) distinguishes it from the statistical regres-
sion equation, and for what reason we should sus-
pect the dependence of Xobsi and εi.
Having a simple example would help us answer
these questions. Consider a classical problem of es-
timation of a production function. Q denotes the
quantity of a homogeneous good produced and L is
the measure of labor input used (e.g., total hours
worked by the employees). We do not consider con-
trol covariates for now. Assume that the production
technology of firm i is given by the following func-
tion,
Qi(L) = exp(β0 + αi)L
β1 , 0< β1 < 1,
where β0 is an unknown constant, αi is a mean zero
unobserved productivity of firm i, and β1 is the pa-
rameter of interest assumed to be constant across
firms. The specified production function leads to a
log-linear equation,
Yi(x) = β0 + β1x+αi,(1.2)
where x = logL and Yi(x) = logQi(L). This equa-
tion can be indeed interpreted as the causal rela-
tionship between output and input in the produc-
tion process of firm i. As in equation (3.3) of the
Imbens’ article, Yi(x) can be interpreted as i’s po-
tential outcomes at each possible input level x ∈ X .
In econometrics terminology, equation (1.2) is inter-
preted as a structural equation in the sense that it
can generate any counterfactual outcomes of unit i
with respect to any manipulations in x. Note that
the structural equation (1.2) relies only on the as-
sumption or knowledge about the underlying causal
mechanism (production function) and, so far, no
considerations on how the data are generated have
entered our discussion yet.
Suppose that available data of pairs of log-output
and log-input of n producers, (Y obsi ,X
obs
i ), i =
1, . . . , n, are observational, meaning that the ob-
served input level Xobsi can be seen as a “choice”
made by a firm i. Following Marschak and Andrews
(1944), let us model each firm’s choice of X based
on the following three assumptions, (1) firms are ra-
tional, meaning that each firm chooses its input to
maximize own profit, (2) the market is under perfect
competition, implying that every firm treat prices of
the good and input (wage) as given and (3) firms
have complete knowledge of their production tech-
nologies β0, β1 and αi when they choose their input
levels. Under these somewhat unrealistic assump-
tions, firm i’s input choice solves the following profit
maximization problem:
Xobsi = logL
obs
i ,
where
Lobsi = argmax
L
{pQi(L)−wiLi},
where p is the (common) price of the good, and wi
is the hourly wage given to firm i, which can vary
over i, that is, the wage is determined at a localized
labor market. The resulting choice Xobsi is
Xobsi =
1
1− β1
[
β0 + log
(
pβ1
wi
)
+αi
]
.(1.3)
If we replace x with Xobsi in (1.2) and notate Y
obs
i =
Yi(X
obs
i ), we obtain
Y obsi = β0 + β1X
obs
i + αi.(1.4)
This equation coincides with an equation of the form
(1.1) without covariates. Equation (1.3) says that a
more productive (higher αi) firm chooses a larger
labor input, implying that the endogeneity problem
E(Xobsi αi) 6= 0 is present. Accordingly, (1.4) must
differ from the linear projection equation of Y obsi
onto Xobsi , and the least squares regression of Y
obs
i
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onto Xobsi fails to consistently estimate β1. Here,
the keypoints are (1) there is a specific causal model
(1.2) underlying (1.4), and (2) the subject’s optimal
“choice” based on the unobservable (to data ana-
lysts) causes correlation E(Xobsi αi) 6= 0.
What can be a reasonable instrumental variable
in the current example? A search for an instrumen-
tal variable can also be model-based. For instance,
if wi is available in data, equation (1.3) says that
Xobsi should be dependent on wi, while structural
equation (1.2) says wi does not directly affect the
output; accordingly, wi satisfies the instrument rel-
evance and the instrument exclusion restriction. The
validity of random assignment E(wiαi) = 0, on the
other hand, would be questionable. For instance,
firms located in an urban area can be more produc-
tive (higher αi) than those located in a rural area,
and the wage level in urban area can be higher than
the wage level in rural, possibly due to a higher liv-
ing cost and availability of more skilled labor force.
The motivation for using control covariates Vi (e.g.,
a demeaned indicator of whether firm i is located in
an urban area or in a rural area) is to cope with po-
tential confounders of wi and αi. Following the way
in which Imbens treats covariates (Section 6), we
assume conditional random assignment wi ⊥ αi|Vi,
and specify the dependence of αi and Vi as
αi = β2Vi + εi with εi ⊥ Vi.(1.5)
Here, εi is firm i’s unobserved productivity mea-
sured relative to conditional mean E(αi|Vi). Note
that coefficient parameter β2 summarizes the de-
pendence of αi and Vi, and we are not attaching
a causal interpretation to β2. Plugging αi into (1.4)
yields the textbook setup of the linear instrumental
variable model (1.1), for which the two stage least
squares procedure yields a consistent estimator for
(β0, β1, β2). As is clear through this simple example,
the textbook equation (1.1) can be seen as a com-
posite of the causal (structural) equation (1.4) and
the statistical dependence relationship (1.5).
2. POINT ESTIMATE VERSUS BOUNDS:
A TREATMENT CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
The discussed paper also reviews the current de-
bate about the meaningfulness of the complier’s
causal effect (Section 4.6). Imbens advocates the im-
portance and practical values of reporting the com-
plier’s causal effect for the reason that it is the only
causal estimand point-identified under the main-
tained assumptions. Imbens, at the same time, ac-
knowledges that the population average causal effect
is a parameter of primary interest in many contexts
of causal inference, and he recommends to report
also the bounds of the population average causal
effect. In my opinion, Imbens’ proposal is quite sen-
sible if the main task of the data analyst is to make
“scientific reporting” about the causal effects. The
point-identified causal parameter for compliers and
the set-identified causal parameter for the entire
population reflect (partially) distinct aspects of the
data distribution, and, importantly, the best we can
learn from data under the maintained assumptions
are only those.
The objectives of causal studies are not only for
“scientific reporting,” but also for assisting “deci-
sion making” of a policy maker. If the latter is a
main task of the data analyst, then my personal
view is that neither of the complier’s causal effect
estimate nor the bounds of the average causal effect
should be the final output that the decision maker
would find most useful. To make my argument more
concrete, suppose that the decision maker’s objec-
tive is to maximize the social welfare defined by the
sum of individual outcomes over the target popu-
lation. As in Chamberlain (2011), we suppose that
he/she solves the treatment choice problem based on
a posterior belief for the social welfare, that is, the
decision maker is Bayesian. Since a comparison of
the social welfare between the cases with and with-
out implementation of the treatment depends only
on the population average causal effect, the poste-
rior distribution of the average causal effect obtained
from her/his carefully specified prior input leads to
the decision maker’s optimal choice (see Chickering
and Pearl (1997) and Imbens and Rubin (1997)) for
Bayesian estimation of the average causal effect).
On the other hand, point estimates and inferential
statements for the complier’s causal effect and the
bounds for the population causal effect do not di-
rectly guide formal decision-making.
The argument I just gave crucially relies on the
Bayesian premise that the decision maker can fully
specify a prior for the potential outcomes distribu-
tions. This may not always be the case depending on
a context. Given the absence of a universal consen-
sus on a “noninformative” prior, inability to specify
a credible prior becomes a serious concern especially
when the causal effect of interest is not identified,
since the lack of identification makes the posterior
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sensitive to a choice of prior no matter how large
the sample size is. One way to overcome this prac-
tical difficulty would be to follow Manski’s (2000,
2005) frequentist approach based on the minimax
and minimax regret decision principle, which relies
only on the knowledge of the bounds of the popula-
tion average causal effect.
The Bayesian approach and Manski’s data-alone
approach are each grounded in the two extreme
schools of statistics. This means that there should
certainly be a room for blending the aspects of these
two approaches to complement their advantages and
disadvantages. One compromising approach would
be to perform a minimax or minimax-regret decision
analysis with multiple priors/posteriors, namely, the
Γ-minimax or Γ-minimax regret decision analysis
(see, e.g., Berger (1985), Chapter 4). For instance,
in the current context, we can consider construct-
ing a set of posteriors of average causal effects by
combining a single posterior for the identifiable pa-
rameters (causal effects for compliers, the mean of
treatment outcome for always-takers, the mean of
control outcome for never-takers) with a collection
of priors of the nonidentified parameters (the mean
of control outcome for always-takers and the mean
of treatment outcome for never-takers). The collec-
tion of priors for the nonidentified parameters may
represent the decision maker’s partial or vague prior
knowledge, or represent the degree of robustness
that the decision maker wants to maintain in mak-
ing the decision. Here, a single prior for the iden-
tified parameters would make sense in a scenario
that the decision maker feels less anxious about a
prior mis-specification for the identifiable parame-
ters since he/she knows data will well update it. If
the class of priors for the nonidentified parameters is
not as large as the one that allows for arbitrary ones,
the resulting posterior Γ-minimax treatment choice
rule will not be as conservative as the Manski’s data-
alone minimax treatment choice rule based solely on
the bounds. At the same time, unlike the standard
Bayesian analysis with a single prior distribution, it
can lead to a decision-making with taking into ac-
count the posterior sensitivity concern with respect
to a choice of a prior for the nonidentified parame-
ters.
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